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Abstract
In debates about knowledge in social work, the terms ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’
are frequently used with varying degrees of positive and negative connotations. We
argue that the terms have become so ambiguous that they should be avoided. In its
place, we suggest focusing on the individual attributes associated with objectivity and
subjectivity and consider how the desirable attributes can be strengthened and the
undesirable ones avoided. This division differs significantly from the typical objective/
subjective division. We examine three key social work issues: the contribution of em-
pirical research, dealing with dissent and the role of the personal. When the attrib-
utes of objectivity and subjectivity are examined in detail, it becomes apparent that
they vary in how desirable and how feasible they are. A more precise use of language
makes it easier to see the contributions of values, bias and power in social work policy
and practice and reduce the risks of people over-claiming the reliability and neutrality
of their assertions.
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Introduction
Social workers have long debated whether their practice is an art or a
science. In that debate, some see objectivity as something to aspire to
while others consider it conflicts with the empathic, context-specific, in-
terpretive understanding that informs their practice. From a study of the
use of the term in the literature, our conclusion is that it has acquired so
many meanings that it obscures more than illuminates the serious issues
at the heart of debates on how to improve services to those who need
social work help. In its place, we suggest focusing on the individual
attributes associated with objectivity and subjectivity and consider how
the desirable attributes can be strengthened and the undesirable ones
avoided. This division differs significantly from the typical objective/sub-
jective division.
As a rough generalisation, the ‘objective’ ideal is more favoured by
managers, policy makers and academics, while those involved in direct
work give more value to their personal skills and understanding.
Consequently, many practitioners share the experience of those reported
in Hardesty’s (2015) study of child-protection workers in Mississippi that
gives a vivid picture of how an agency that privileges the achievement of
objectivity over the other skills of social workers influences their sense
of what matters, and leads them to feel that they are living in two
worlds. On the one hand, they are encouraged to be empathic—to use
their imagination and emotions to try and feel as well as they can how
the parents, the child, the wider family members might be experiencing
the situation. This plays a major part in the development of their under-
standing of the case and their planning of what needs to be done, as it
should, and as several studies have reported does indeed happen
(Munro, 1999; Bartelink et al., 2015). However, when it comes to writing
up their work, especially when it is writing it up for an outsider such as
a judge, they are expected to be ‘objective’—that is, to seek to remove
all trace of the worker as the observer and interpreter of the family.
This attempt to remove or hide the subjective elements of practice
suggests that they are seen as second-class, inferior to objective knowl-
edge. Indeed, many of the reforms in recent decades have sought to
eliminate or minimise the contribution of the individual worker.
Performance indicators prescribing how long a task should take, assess-
ment frameworks prescribing what information should be gathered and
decision aids that calculate a conclusion on the information entered are
all reducing the autonomy of the worker. There is a growing trend to de-
fine ‘evidence-based practice’ as practice that uses an evaluated method
of intervention instead of its original meaning in evidence-based medi-
cine and evidence-based social work where it referred to a practitioner
drawing upon the best evidence from research as well as their clinical
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expertise and the user’s preferences in deciding what to do, namely mak-
ing an expert judgement (Sackett, 1996; Gambrill, 1999). This shift has
the effect of downplaying the role of individual reasoning.
We are not opposed to such reform efforts in themselves but will ar-
gue that undertaking them using a simplistic notion of objectivity is
harmful for the development of social work effectiveness. As an alterna-
tive, we offer a more nuanced approach that recognises the strengths
and weaknesses in the range of our ways of reasoning.
Because of the authors’ experience, the practice references in this arti-
cle are to children and family social work, but the key arguments apply
to all branches of social work.
We begin by exploring the meanings ascribed to the terms and offer
the example of perception as a paradigm example of objectivity, con-
trasting this with a typical example of social work practice. This identi-
fies the key attributes, both desirable and undesirable, associated with
the terms ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’.
We then examine how each attribute can or should be achieved in so-
cial work using three key issues to illustrate the details: the contribution
of empirical research, dealing with dissent and the role of the personal.
This is potentially a mammoth task so we only begin to sketch it out.
The aim is to show that being more precise in what we want to achieve
or avoid is more constructive than using one blanket, ill-defined notion
to do many different jobs. It both allows more attention to strengthening
reasoning that is typically seen as subjective and also reduces the prob-
lem of claims to objectivity obscuring implicit values, bias or use of
power.
Defining objectivity and subjectivity
The concepts of objectivity and subjectivity are typically defined relative
to each other: if something is not objective, then it is subjective. They
have a surprisingly varied history, as shown in Daston and Galison’s
(2007) study. Although objectivity is now strongly associated with sci-
ence, Daston and Gallison date its emergence as a scientific term as late
as the mid-nineteenth century, long after the scientific revolution of the
seventeenth century. It emerged in tandem with the concept of subjectiv-
ity and a variety of different meanings of objectivity have been con-
trasted with a variety of different meanings of subjectivity, not always
one-to-one. Discussions of objectivity focus not just on what it offers,
but what it guards us against, namely subjectivity. One example is ‘to be
objective is to aspire to knowledge that bears no trace of the knower—
knowledge unmarked by prejudice or skill, fantasy or judgment, wishing
or striving’ (Daston and Galison, 2007, p. 17).
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To clarify the meaning of ‘objectivity’ and to illustrate its appeal, we
take as an example the proposition ‘there is a table in this room’. We of-
fer the example of sensory perception not just because it is simple, but
because the paradigm of sensory perception seems to be central to the
power and attraction of the concept of objectivity, and it helps us iden-
tify its desirable attributes.
There is a reliable process for establishing the truth of the proposition
‘there is a table in this room’. It is possible to specify the rules to follow
to reach the correct conclusion—use your eyes. The process is
transparent—we can say how we checked the truth. It is impersonal—
anyone who understands the language of the proposition and has reason-
able eyesight can check its truth. It is value-free—the observer’s
personal values or preferences do not influence their observation. If
someone disagrees with the majority view, it is generally possible to find
sound reasons to exclude their view: there is something wrong with their
eyesight; they do not understand the language. Overall, there is a reli-
able, rule-following, impersonal, value-free and transparent way of
establishing the truth and so there is convergence of opinion with means
of legitimately discrediting the view of anyone who disagrees. We can
feel confident that the proposition is true and others will agree with us.
These attributes of reliability, convergence, impersonality, value free-
dom, rule following and transparency seem to capture what is aspired to
when objectivity is sought in social work. It is easy to understand their
potential benefits. Reliable knowledge contributes to more accurate
assessments and more effective services. Convergence and legitimate
ways of excluding dissenting voices are reassuring when dealing with
judgements and decisions with far-reaching consequences for service
users: conclusions can be reached that are ‘right’ to everyone and not
imposed by one person or group on another, such as by the powerful so-
cial worker on the service user. Impersonality makes service users less
vulnerable to the biases, values or preferences of the particular social
worker they are dealing with. Rule following makes it possible to teach
others how to reach the correct conclusion. It also helps to make prac-
tice more transparent, allowing others to check the reasoning process.
This is particularly valuable now when it has become a major require-
ment for professionals to account for their actions not just to service
users, but also to society generally and central government funders in
particular (Power, 1997).
To what extent does or can social work practice share these attributes
of perception? We offer an example of a typical social work relationship
with a family to explore this.
The scenario is a social worker working with a family where a child
has suffered significant harm from a physical injury inflicted by the fa-
ther and is now on a child-protection plan (i.e. services are working with
the family with the goal of creating sufficient safety for the child to be
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able to stay at home). We give them all names to highlight the lack of
impersonality in this scenario. The social worker is Jane, the mother
Sharon, the father Phil and the one-year-old baby girl is Mia. Jane has
developed a good relationship with Sharon, whom she likes, but a more
distant one with Phil, whom she finds a little frightening. He claims that
the injury occurred when he was chastising Mia for misbehaviour and he
did not intend to cause such an injury—that is, it was accidental. Jane
hopes that it will be possible for the child to stay with her parents. She
uses her knowledge of abusive behaviour and strategies for changing be-
haviour as well as her empathic understanding of life in this family as
she seeks to help them identify the problems that provoke Phil’s anger
and ways in which he could manage his anger less destructively and dis-
cipline Mia in less harmful ways.
This scenario exemplifies an approach to practice that does not score
very well against the attributes of objectivity listed above. Neither re-
search nor her empathic understanding provides ‘reliable’ understanding
in the sense of being certain, especially about the father’s motivation
when he hit Mia. Her work is rule-following in a limited sense in that
there are procedures for managing cases (Department for Education,
2015) but these are high-level outlines of how to proceed. Considerable
autonomy is exercised by each worker in deciding how to work in detail.
Jane is not interchangeable with any other social worker: Sharon and
Phil have formed a relationship with her personally and another worker
might have acted differently in many respects. The work is not value-
free: the law embodies the principle that children should be with their
birth family if possible and Jane is influenced by her own view on the
importance of the birth family in deciding how to weight the principle in
this case. Some degree of transparency is required: her reasoning will be
scrutinised as the case proceeds by family members, her supervisor,
other professionals who know the family and ultimately by the courts if
she decides the child is not safe at home and seeks power to remove
her. But this transparency need not lead to convergence of opinion.
Professionals and parents often disagree on what is best for the child. In
contrast, when disagreements on perception arise, the transparency of
the process shows how disagreement has arisen, and hence allows its res-
olution by seeing who went wrong and how, including the option of ex-
cluding one view because it does not conform with the protocols. But
Jane’s colleagues may just think that her empathetic account of Sharon
is wrong. They may challenge it, and they may all come to agree after
all. But that will not be the result of applying common professional
standards. And, if they do not agree, there is no basis for excluding
Jane’s view on the grounds that it is subjective, lacking in objectivity.
They just disagree. Transparency means that her decision has been
explained, by setting out her reasons. Other people—her colleagues or
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family members—might well have reached a different conclusion for
their different reasons.
This picture of practice is a long way from the paradigm of objectivity.
Should we feel worried or ashamed by this and aspire to increasing the
objectivity of practice, or is some of what subjectivity brings to the work
both unavoidable and desirable?
Why is objectivity seen as desirable in social work?
While there have been numerous debates in the philosophy of science
about the precise meaning of the terms ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’,
two features are constant. First, claiming objectivity entails a claim
about the accuracy or reliability of the knowledge and, in this context,
subjectivity is seen as fallible. Second, claiming objectivity entails a claim
that the listener/reader can trust the findings (Reiss and Sprenger, 2014).
Both of these claims carry weight in social work. Reliable knowledge
can contribute to more effective services. The interest in evidence-based
practice and the encouragement to monitor the effectiveness of interven-
tions inherent in the English inspection framework both illustrate the
drive to improve results.
Trust is also important, since society gives social workers the responsi-
bility to intervene in the lives of individuals and families. When society
feels little trust in them, then social workers find their judgements and
decisions being questioned and they need to rely on the endorsement of
other professionals (doctors, psychologists) when presenting a case in
court. Also, when parents do not feel trust in the social workers’ exper-
tise, they may fear asking for help in case they are misunderstood.
Increasing objectivity in practice is seen as one route for building trust.
It is how this can or cannot be achieved that we examine in the follow-
ing three sections.
The contribution of empirical research
Empirical research is seen by many as the primary source of objective
knowledge. There is a growing tendency to equate ‘evidence’ with the
findings of research, as in the phrase ‘evidence-based policy and prac-
tice’. This is in contrast to the everyday use of the term, where ‘evi-
dence’ refers to the range of information that is called upon to justify a
conclusion. In this sense, a social worker draws on information obtained
from numerous sources, such as direct observation, reports from others,
past history, laws and procedures. We have two major concerns about
current practices around using empirical research. First, its reliability,
value freedom and the contribution it can make are frequently
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exaggerated. Second, it is being given high status while improving the re-
liability of other sources of evidence is being neglected.
On the first point, we agree wholeheartedly that research is valuable.
Research methods aim to minimise the effects of bias so that we can
have some confidence in the conclusions. However, whether in the natu-
ral or social sciences, they cannot claim to produce infallible knowledge.
In some areas of research, this point can be seen as just a philosophical
nicety, while the conclusions are treated in practice as ‘true’. In research
of relevance to social work, it is rare to find such consensus or robust
conclusions. Littell’s (2005) review of studies of the effectiveness of
multi-systemic therapy illustrates the complexity of research of the social
world. She reports that there were variations in the overall conclusion
on whether it was effective or not and, within those reporting some ef-
fectiveness, there was no consistency in the variables that showed im-
provement. Such variability is not surprising when studying human
behaviour, but it illustrates the point that we do not have a body of re-
search that gives us universal laws but more nuanced indications that
some variables tend to be influenced by some other factors on some
occasions. This point indicates the need to treat research findings with
caution but not to dismiss them—we are right to have some confidence
in the findings.
The value freedom of research is also problematic. Values enter sci-
ence at several points. They influence the choice of research problem
and methods, what starting assumptions are allowed, what modelling
strategies are used, what evidence is gathered, the acceptance of a the-
ory or hypothesis as an adequate answer, and the proliferation and ap-
plication of the results (Reiss and Sprenger, 2014).
The influence of values can be seen in social work research. While
most would agree that human behaviour is influenced by both internal
and external factors, values affect the choice of targets of research and
of interventions. Over the decades, social workers have, to varying
degrees, been interested in both social action to change the environment
and individual work to change individuals and their contexts.
Values also influence the content of specific interventions. For exam-
ple, the extent to which it is believed that the wider family and commu-
nity should share in the task of raising children influences efforts to
improve the care of children. Hopman et al. analyse the assumptions in
the Triple P parenting programme, asking ‘what kinds of values are be-
ing passed on to parents and children participating in these interven-
tions?’ (Hopman et al., 2014, p. 1358). They report that ‘a sense of
belonging’ is not highlighted in Triple P and the approach does not high-
light the value of the wider social network in resolving parenting issues.
In contrast, the Signs of Safety approach to child welfare does emphasise
the role of the wider family and the naturally occurring social networks
as a crucial resource to improve the care of children (Turnell, 2012).
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The difference is perhaps linked to the context in which the interven-
tions were developed. While both originate in Australia, Signs of Safety
was influenced strongly by traditional child-raising practices of
Aboriginal culture while Triple P was more influenced by the white
culture.
Research does not eradicate the personal. Researchers’ socio-temporal
location influences their perception of the social world and the way
problems are framed. This has been well explored by feminist critiques
of male research (Oakley, 2000) and within social work, where there are
concerns about the class and ethnicity of researchers compared with
those of the subjects of research (Rubin and Babbie, 2016).
Research is associated with the objective attribute of reliability but
this is a desirable quality of all social work reasoning. It is an aspiration
both for the information used and the way in which it is used in reason-
ing to an action. Ideally, the ‘right’ people get the ‘right’ service. Its rele-
vance cuts across the standard objective/subjective distinction. We are
concerned with the reliability of information used in reasoning, however
it is collected—that is, by direct observation, by expert judgement, by
reports from others or from research findings. An emphasis on seeking
reliable knowledge through empirical research can distract focus from
the importance of improving the reliability of information, however
obtained.
In social work practice, the importance of checking information for
accuracy is recognised with numerous ways of doing so, such as finding
more examples of the relevant behaviour, obtaining the views of others
and critically reflecting on your reasoning, usually with the help of a su-
pervisor or colleagues. However, its importance is often overlooked
when an agency is under pressure when workers are pushed to complete
tasks quickly. Eradicating poor work conditions can be a far more effec-
tive way of improving accuracy than eradicating ‘subjectivity’.
Expert judgement is also essential in engaging with families and in ap-
plying guidance and procedures to specific cases. Yet, again, work condi-
tions can fail to nurture the development of more reliable expert
judgement by reducing the continuity of contact so workers do not have
the feedback to know whether their judgements were accurate or not.
Reliability can be threatened by the undesirable attributes often
associated with subjectivity—bias, prejudice, self-interest, personal in-
volvement and whimsicality. Unfortunately, these can operate at an un-
conscious level so they are hard to eradicate. Racial prejudice, for
example, may be consciously considered abhorrent and yet studies reveal
that it can influence professional practice unconsciously. In Cleaver and
Freeman’s (1995) study, workers were given vignettes and asked to as-
sess the level of danger for the child. When the vignette included the ad-
ditional information that the mother was West Indian, the danger was
rated higher than when this information was omitted.
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Moreover, the danger of the undesirable attributes associated with
subjectivity still exists in research. Research methods aim to minimise
the intrusion of these undesirable attributes but it is increasingly recog-
nised that their success is partial. For example, medical journals now re-
quire authors to make a ‘competing interests declaration’ because, for
example, funding sources might bias the reported findings. Evaluations
of interventions conducted by those who have a commercial interest in
the product are treated with more caution than those by independent
researchers. Transparency in research is dependent upon comprehensive
and honest accounts of the studies being available. Articles summarising
research will contain selective material to limit the size, but fuller details
should be made available in research reports or on individuals’ web
pages. There is a growing literature on how research findings can be in-
correctly communicated or misunderstood (Sterne et al., 2001; Ioannidis,
2005; Mazar and Ariely, 2015). Greenberg (2009), for example, shows
how citations of research can lead to major distortions in later referen-
ces to that research: ‘Through distortions in its social use that include
bias, amplification, and invention, citation can be used to generate infor-
mation cascades resulting in unfounded authority of claims’ (p. 1).
One final point to make about research is that, although valuable, it
can make only a limited contribution to the final decision on what action
to take, since many other factors—case-specific, moral, financial or
legal—may need to be considered. In addition, deciding whether a study
is relevant to the problem you are dealing with is complex: ‘You are of-
ten told that you will need to judge that your context is sufficiently
like the one of the RCT. “Sufficiently like” is, however, a challenging
judgement to make when working in the social world’ (Munro et al.,
2017, p. 7).
Dealing with dissent
A claim to objectivity can imply a claim that anyone who is dissenting
has no valid grounds to do so. To return to the simple perception exam-
ple, if someone denies that there is a table in the room, we can generally
find a reason for dismissing their opinion, such as their having poor eye-
sight. Can social workers draw on ‘objective knowledge’ to dismiss dis-
senting views from service users?
When a worker and a parent conflict on what is best for a child, how
is this to be resolved? An assessment of the parenting is crucial in the
case scenario of Jane and the parents, and is central to child and family
social work generally: it forms the basis of decisions about what services,
if any, a family needs. The task carries major consequences for children,
young people and their families—no help may be offered although
wanted, services may be offered or, in extreme cases, legal proceedings
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may be started with the aim of breaking up the family and removing the
children.
When it comes to defining ‘good’ parenting, research has shown that
there is considerable variation in parenting beliefs and practices linked
to factors such as socio-economic status, religion, race and ethnicity
(Garcia Coll et al., 1995). For example, spanking as a disciplinary
method, co-sleeping and adult nudity in front of children are all seen as
undesirable by some and culturally normal by others (Craig et al., 2000).
‘Good’ parenting can be defined as, among other things, parenting
that contributes to helping the child develop into a ‘good’ person. Views
on this vary too. Gender differences around the world are particularly
noticeable, with some cultures wanting well-educated, independent
women and others wanting well-behaved women who acknowledge the
authority of the men in their lives. Governments’ worries about poor
parenting have varied over time. In England in 1900, the primary worry
was about children’s physical health as so many young men were found
to be unfit to fight in the Boer War. In 1997, the new Labour govern-
ment was clear that its main concern was ‘education, education,
education’.
There are differences also in how parents would balance the dimen-
sions of a ‘good’ outcome when achieving on one goal seems to reduce
the chances of achieving on another; for example, achieving good educa-
tional outcomes can at times have an adverse impact on mental health.
This seems an area where knowledge with all the attributes of objec-
tivity would be useful but, even if available, it would not resolve the dif-
ferences in goals.
In reality, although there is considerable diversity over time and be-
tween cultures, in any one society, there will be many occasions on
which services users and social workers agree on ends but the disagree-
ment is about how to achieve them. Jane and Mia’s parents may agree
that chastisement is necessary, but disagree on the best ways of doing
so. In this particular scenario, Jane can take the simple option of saying
the English law bans physical chastisement of the level practised by the
father but she can also draw on research to challenge the view that it is
the most effective means of disciplining a child. Research has a valuable
role to play in giving weight to social workers’ judgements, but it does
not amount to a total knockout of any dissenting opinion.
Disagreements are hard to deal with. Discussions can illuminate the
thinking behind the rival views and efforts to achieve consensus in social
work can lead to agreement. However, there are times when social
workers need to exercise authority in over-riding parents and justify it
by referring to their expert knowledge. This requires them to have a
good knowledge of the relevant research and to keep up to date with
developments.
420 Eileen Munro and Jeremy Hardie
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/bjsw
/article-abstract/49/2/411/5253551 by London School of Econom
ics user on 29 April 2019
The role of the personal
Impersonality is valued in seeking objectivity because it is contrasted
with people bringing personal baggage—values, feelings, preferences—to
the reasoning process and thereby distorting it. However, social work is
a human service and there are limits to how impersonal it can be. The
personal enters in two main areas: in the relationships between workers
and service users, and in making judgements.
The importance of relationships
Social work generally involves having some direct contact with services
users and this involves some relationship. This is not an option, but an
aspect of people talking to each other—we react to each other automati-
cally and to a large degree unconsciously. In the case scenario, Jane is
not just any social worker to the parents; she is a specific personality.
The Munro Review of Child Protection (2011) highlighted the way
that many of the reforms that were designed to formalise practice more
have reduced the individual contribution and so have ignored or under-
valued the importance of the interactions between social workers and
service users. As a consequence of the efforts to formalise practice,
work conditions had been modified in many places to reduce continuity
of contact, with service users being moved along a conveyor belt of tasks
within the formalised process.
Organisational cultures have also changed in deleterious ways. Close
involvement has two key consequences for organisations. First, it can in-
troduce bias, as the worker’s relationship with individual users influences
their reasoning. For instance, feeling sympathy for a neglectful mother
can lead to an underestimate of the harmful effect of the neglect on the
child (Horwath and Tarr, 2015). Supervision and discussions with col-
leagues are ways in which this bias can be identified and rectified.
However, the priority given to supervision is diminished in organisations
that focus on meeting performance indicators and, even where it occurs,
it can focus on process issues more than on substantive review of the
reasoning about a case (Turner-Daly and Jack, 2014).
Second, close involvement has a psychological cost for social workers
who are exposed to intense forms of human misery, anger and anxiety.
The importance of organisational support was commonly accepted in the
past but is less prioritised nowadays. Several studies have shown the ex-
tent to which social workers rely on conversations with colleagues to
manage the cognitive and emotional dimensions of their work (Helm,
2013; Saltiel, 2016) but reforms such as hot desking can reduce the op-
portunities to do so.
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Rather than seeing impersonality as the desirable goal, it would be
more constructive to seek ways of reducing the bias that can be part of
the necessarily personal relationship between social workers and service
users.
Rule following and making judgements
Recent decades show a steady increase in the rules and guidance being
provided to social workers, so it raises the question as to whether the
ideal state is to turn social work into a wholly rule-bound activity so that
whoever followed the rules would reach the same conclusion and take
the same actions in relation to service users—that is, the contribution of
the individual could be eradicated. Concerns for social justice and equity
make this seem desirable. There is something disturbing about service
users being at the mercy of the particular worker they meet. However,
there is also something disturbing about thinking that a helping profes-
sion can be reduced to a set of rules.
This is an area where the cultural preference for explicit logical pro-
cesses is, we think, having a damaging effect on the development of so-
cial work practice. It is damaging in that rule-bound services are failing
to provide requisite variety (Ashby, 1991) to meet the range of needs of
service users. Timescales for completing assessments, for example, are
an over-rigid interpretation of the principle that timeliness matters and
drift is harmful to children. One child may need urgent assessment so
the timescale is too long and another might be in a very complicated sit-
uation where a satisfactory assessment cannot be achieved in the speci-
fied time. Judgement is needed to determine how to apply the principle
of timeliness in any particular case.
The admiration for rules is also damaging by focusing reform efforts
on creating more rules rather than focusing on how to help social work-
ers make more accurate judgements. Yet this is an area where a growing
body of research provides a wealth of ideas (Gigerenzer and Edwards,
2003; Klein, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). There is no algorithm leading to
the ‘right’ answer, but there are better and worse ways of deliberating.
There is reason to be concerned about the variety of differences in so-
cial work judgements, such as about the level of risk a child is exposed
to (Regehr et al., 2010; Bartelink et al., 2014; Fleming et al., 2014).
However, the extent to which greater consensus can be achieved through
objective measures is debatable. In some jurisdictions, actuarial risk-
assessment tools are being used to turn the process into a rule-following
one. These typically claim to be objective—for example, ‘The actuarial
risk assessment can be described as an objective classification tool that
estimates the likelihood of future harm’ (Mendoza et al., 2016, p. 2).
Yet, the construction of such tools involved several judgements about
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what data and methods to use. Their data-set is biased because it is
drawn from administrative data of families known to child-protection
services—a group where low-income and ethnic minority families are
overrepresented. These may be referred more frequently for reasons
unrelated to being more abusive or neglectful than the population in
general. The point here is not to reject such approaches to improving
risk assessment, but to question what exactly is claimed—and what can
justifiably be claimed—by describing them as objective.
Ironically, such risk-assessment tools have a deleterious effect on an-
other of the desired attributes of objectivity: transparency. A decision is
reached where not even the social worker, and certainly not the family,
is aware of how it was computed. Even though the rules to explain it
are available, such an explanation would require extensive study and, in
reality, it means workers are using the tool blindly and families do not
understand the way in which major decisions are made about them.
Rules can be created in areas of work where they are otherwise not
appropriate as a mechanism for deflecting blame. Hood et al. (2001)
have analysed how the rise of a blame culture has led to more ‘protoco-
lisation’, setting out a set of rules to follow so that the individual and or-
ganisation can defend themselves against any adverse outcome by saying
‘we followed the protocol’. Such a defence has been used in social work
when a child dies: ‘procedures were followed.’
The view that rules are the ideal and relying on judgement is second-
best misunderstands why rules are inappropriate in some cases: it is not
a weakness in our current understanding, but a feature of the complex
world in which we live. If social work is to provide a personal service,
social workers need to be able to take account of unique features of the
case rather than taking the procrustean approach of mutilating service
users to fit their system.
Moreover, the use of rules, even where appropriate, often relies first
on the use of individual expertise. A social worker has to decide which
rules apply in a given situation. In the inquiry into the care of Victoria
Climbie´ (Laming, 2003), the social worker and her supervisor were
criticised for not following procedure. But a closer reading of the text
shows that the mistake they made was about how to classify the case:
they managed it as one requiring family support not as a child-
protection investigation. They failed to follow the right child-protection
procedures because they had decided that they were irrelevant in this
case. That decision was not rules-based, but resulted from a mistaken ex-
pert judgement.
The central principle is that rules need to be judged on whether they
achieve their intended aim in terms of helping service users and the con-
clusion must be that they have only a limited role in the complex sce-
nario of working with service users to solve problems.
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Conclusion
Intuition and empathy are central to how humans reason about the
world and how social workers seek to help those who use their services.
Our analytic skill strengthens our understanding but does not replace
their central role. Efforts to make social work more objective are seek-
ing to create a bigger role for analytic reasoning. This is desirable, but
the theme of this article has been to criticise current efforts both for
over-claiming what analytic processes can achieve and under-valuing in-
tuitive and empathic skills.
There are several sources of motivation for seeking to make social
work use more explicit analytic reasoning, some of which are more
praiseworthy than others. First, there is the desire to use our logical
skills to strengthen our ability to offer effective help to service users.
Second, some degree of standardisation looks desirable to reduce the el-
ement of chance in the service any user experiences, with social workers
operating in very different ways. Third, there is an understandable but
worrying need to manage the high level of anxiety in a service that deals
with high-risk scenarios in a very punitive social climate. Providing a
protocol for practice can reduce individual accountability and offer the
defence that due process has been followed. And, finally, there is the
prosaic factor that work within the technical rational paradigm that
underpins the search for objectivity is good for a university career.
When the attributes of objectivity are explored, it becomes apparent
that they vary in how desirable or feasible they are. Even when empiri-
cal research can be well evidenced and reliable, it is not alone sufficient
to make decisions on what to do in social work. Conflicting values, polit-
ical views and preferences can create situations of conflict between so-
cial workers and users. Some judgement has to be made about whose
opinion carries most weight. In some scenarios (e.g. when a child is at
risk of suffering significant harm), social workers will use their authority
to decide that their expert opinion outweighs the family. In others, the
users’ views are paramount. Values permeate the work and processes
that appear objective can be based on implicit values. Rule following is
feasible with simple tasks but fails to handle the variety in the complex
worlds of services users. Moreover, judgement is needed in deciding
what rule applies in a particular situation. Some aspects of practice can
be made transparent but can then mislead because it is such a limited
picture of the work. And, finally, the impersonality associated with ob-
jectivity seems out of reach in the human activity of engaging with an-
other to understand and help them with their problems, but strategies
can reduce the risk of bias.
The overall conclusion from this exploration is that talk of ‘objectivity’ is
highly ambiguous and misleading. The simplicity of the objective/subjective
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divide is distorting and detracts attention for the need to be as concerned
about the presence of attributes such as bias, self-interest and unreliability
in ‘objective’ research as in the practices typically labelled as subjective.
Often, a claim to be objective reflects only one or two of the attributes
such as when ‘reliability’ is claimed meaning ‘inter-rater agreement of a
small group of trained personnel’—not the attribute of accuracy that is as-
sociated in the common-sense meaning of reliable. Talk of objectivity can
also mislead in that it refers to some layer of practice such as saying that
performance indicators collect objective data but fails to discuss the values
and theories that underpin the choice of indicators.
We conclude with two suggestions. Instead of talking of objectivity
and subjectivity, we should be more precise and state which of their
attributes we are referring to. And all of us need to be more cautious
and critical in our use of knowledge. The solid appearance provided by
objectivity needs to be replaced with a hesitant acceptance of knowledge
claims as possibly the best available at present.
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